Omar García Harfuch and the relaunch of security as a priority for the Mexican State: From moral discourse to institutional effectiveness

The first year of Claudia Sheinbaum’s government marks a turning point in public security and national security policy: Mexico is transitioning from rhetoric to results, from ideology to intelligence.

The appearance of Security Secretary Omar García Harfuch before the Senate of the Republic was not just an exercise in accountability, but an act of political affirmation: the Mexican State is recovering its capacity to govern the territory and control violence. For some, the speech marked a silent break with the recent past; for others, it is something closer to change without rupture. Where there were once moral promises, today data, results, and structures are presented to demonstrate that security, for the first time in a long while, is explained through effectiveness.

Toward the Second floor of the Transformation in security matters: The state recovers ground

In the analysis of Secretary García Harfuch’s speech during his appearance before the Senate, it is clear that his political intention is to show that Mexico is entering a new stage of the Fourth Transformation: one where security is no longer defined by narrative, but by the State’s capacity to produce measurable and sustainable results.

Beyond the numbers—which were many and compelling—the political message was another: the institutional reconstruction of public security as the backbone of Claudia Sheinbaum’s government. That is why what we heard was not a simple speech to applaud achievements, but a roadmap toward a more ambitious project: a modern, technologized, and intelligence-based State Security, which will have costs in terms of both resources and a new social pact regarding citizens’ freedoms.

From this argument arise the recent constitutional and legal reforms in security matters that have been legislated in the last year, subject to criticism from various actors who have considered them contrary to citizens’ freedoms and the progressivity of human rights.

During the past six years, security in Mexico was explained through a moral narrative: «the good against the corrupt,» «hugs instead of bullets.» That narrative had its historical moment to help implement a new regime, but it also had its limits.

Today, under Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration, the strategy seems to have shifted to different ground: institutional efficiency, federal-territorial coordination, and police professionalization to provide support for the second stage of the Fourth Transformation (4T) political project, of which President Sheinbaum is a part, moreover as its first president emerging from that political movement without origins in the old regime.

In a Senate with an official majority and a testimonial opposition, Secretary Harfuch presented figures that speak of a country that, despite its wounds, is beginning to recover operational capacity and institutional trust. The 46% decrease in crime-related homicides compared to 2018, the dismantling of more than 1,500 methamphetamine laboratories, and the capture of more than 35,000 violence generators are data that by themselves send an unequivocal message: the State is returning to exercise control over the territory.

But it is not just about numbers; it is about a reconstruction of the Mexican State from its most sensitive architecture: security.

The new map of security in Mexico

The states and regions mentioned in the speech—Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Guerrero, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and the northern border—were not chosen at random. They are, at the same time, the country’s industrial nodes and the main corridors of organized crime.

The message is clear: security and economic development are no longer separate issues. In a context of nearshoring, energy investment, and industrial relocation, the federal government’s priority is to protect critical infrastructure and supply chains, especially in the center and north of the country.

The deployment of 10,000 National Guard elements in seven border entities and the record seizures of cocaine, weapons, and fentanyl not only reflect operational efficiency: they reaffirm the political will to build, from the Mexican side of the border, a wall of sovereignty based on intelligence and actions with strategic impact, not just rhetoric, especially in a context of enormous pressure from the United States under the Trump administration.

Cooperate without subordinating

An aspect little commented on, but of enormous strategic relevance, is the new relationship with the United States. The transfer of 55 high-profile criminals to U.S. prisons is a calculated gesture: it shows willingness to cooperate, but also sovereign decision-making capacity, albeit aware of the existing asymmetrical relationship.

Harfuch has achieved what few officials in recent administrations have: being a reliable interlocutor for Washington without renouncing the nationalist narrative that characterizes the 4T. That skill, forged in his career as a police officer and as a politician, makes him today one of the most influential actors with the greatest projection toward 2030.

Peace as a public good of the State

Perhaps the most important message of the speech was not said with words, but with structure: every achievement, every figure, every operation was presented as a result of inter-institutional coordination between the Army, Air Force, Navy, National Guard, and state governments.

That way of presenting the results conveys a central idea: security does not depend on one person, but on a system. A system that, with its imperfections, is beginning to function with its own logic.

The concept of lasting peace appears not as an ethical promise, but as a measurable institutional goal: criminal intelligence, territorial presence, and verifiable reduction of crimes.

In summary, it is about governing the territory again from the State’s public policy, and not from reaction or improvisation.

A new political cycle

President Sheinbaum knows that security will be the thermometer of her six-year term. In view of the 2027 midterm election that will renew the Chamber of Deputies and the eventual mandate revocation referendum, advances in this area could define the political direction of her government and the legacy of which she is a part.

That is why Harfuch’s speech before the Senate, more than a simple appearance, should also be read as an internal political message: the security cabinet has direction, method, and results. In an administration that seeks to consolidate its own stamp within the Fourth Transformation, security has become the bridge between political legitimacy and technical effectiveness.

Mexico seems to be leaving behind the stage of narratives to enter that of results; therefore, the challenge now will be to sustain those results over time, ensuring they do not depend on names or circumstances, but on solid, reliable, and permanent institutions.

Security is not a goal: it is a continuous process of learning and adaptation, and perhaps for the first time in a long while, the Mexican State is beginning to show that it has learned to learn.

Harfuch’s speech was not the closure of a cycle, but the beginning of a new one: that of a country that, with all its contradictions, is once again believing that it can govern its destiny through intelligence, law, coordination, and cooperation.

Analysis: The Structural Redesign of Security in Mexico 2024

by Jonathan Maza

Mexico City, December 11, 2024

Article originally published in The Wilson Center.

Mexico remains in a prolonged period of security instability. The greatest challenge facing the current political regime is to pacify the country and regain territorial control, which has been contested by various criminal organizations. This is happening amid profound changes and transformations in the political regime and the Constitution itself.

Below is a brief analysis of the recent constitutional reforms, their impacts on the Mexican government’s security strategy, and the implications for the bilateral security relationship between Mexico and the United States. 

Constitutional Reform: A Significant Shift in the Security Model

Mexico is transitioning to a centralized security model characterized by a civil-military institutional framework, where the federal government is increasingly consolidating legal authority, responsibilities, and budgetary control over states and municipalities. The Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (SSPC) has become a key institution, acquiring new powers and capabilities that enable the Federal Executive Branch to oversee resources, criminal investigations, and intelligence for national security.

Recent reforms to Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution[1] and the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration[2] mark a critical shift in the institutional framework for public and national security. The SSPC and its leadership now centralize and coordinate intelligence generated by civil and military agencies. Additionally, the SSPC has been granted authority to investigate crimes in collaboration with the Public Prosecutor’s Office—a role it shares with the National Guard (GN) and local police forces.

The SSPC is responsible for developing and leading the National Public Security Strategy, as well as public security programs and policies. It also coordinates and leads joint operations with all public security institutions nationwide. Working alongside the Attorney General’s Office (FGR), it executes arrest warrants with the support of the armed forces, including the GN. The National Guard, no longer under the SSPC, has been transferred to the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA). As per the constitutional reform of September 30, 2024, the National Guard is now both a public security force and a new branch of the armed forces[3].

To fulfill these responsibilities and lead the country’s security and intelligence efforts, a new Subsecretariat for Intelligence and Police Investigation has been established. It appears that the National Intelligence Center (CNI) will be reoriented to focus more on public and internal security intelligence at the expense of national security priorities.

Through the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System, the federal government will gain greater control over states and municipalities in security matters. By having the authority to establish guidelines, standardize protocols, and audit as well as oversee the allocation of resources, it ensures compliance with the operational functions of public security institutions and the police forces at both state and municipal levels.

This redesign aims to strengthen the Mexican government’s capacity to combat organized crime, which has infiltrated hundreds of local police forces and corrupted municipal governments. By integrating intelligence into criminal investigations, the goal is to prosecute cases based on information from both civil and military agencies. An example of this new “coordination” is the recent “Operación Enjambre” (“Swarm“ Operation) conducted on November 22, 2024, in the State of Mexico. Using shared intelligence, authorities arrested 24 public officials, including a municipal president and several directors of public security from 12 municipalities. These individuals were linked to criminal organizations such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, La Familia Michoacana, and others.

With these new powers, the SSPC has become a kind of super-ministry, resembling a hybrid between an Office of National Intelligence and a Department of Justice. It leads intelligence integration and investigates and executes arrest warrants but does not have prosecutorial authority. In theory, this model could enhance the effectiveness of security operations by allowing the SSPC to take an active and strategic role. However, its implementation raises questions about potential challenges and repercussions.

Centralization may impact Mexico’s security strategy by increasing tensions among the country’s security agencies, which have historically operated autonomously with varying levels of coordination. Potential risks include the growing militarization of public security policies and the blurring of lines between public and national security—issues that could provoke resistance from civil institutions and national and international human rights organizations.

Finally, Mexico’s security redesign is likely to impact its relationship with the United States by reconfiguring cooperation channels. This has already generated tensions over intelligence sharing and is expected to further highlight differences in security approaches. The centralization of the SSPC and its operational reliance on the armed forces have raised concerns among U.S. security agencies about Mexico’s ability to address critical issues such as the increasing influence of organized crime and border security. These dynamics have complicated operational collaboration, particularly in sensitive areas such as fentanyl trafficking, arms smuggling, and human trafficking. As a result, a recalibration of objectives and protocols between the two countries will be necessary to strengthen strategic cooperation. 


[1] Initiative presented by the President of Mexico, Dr. Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, before the Senate of the Republic on October 30, 2024.

[2] DECREE amending, supplementing, and repealing various provisions of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration. Published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on November 28, 2024.

[3] DECREE amending and supplementing Articles 13, 16, 21, 32, 55, 73, 76, 78, 82, 89, 123, and 129 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, concerning the National Guard. Published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on September 30, 2024.

Analysis of the New Security Strategy of the Government of Mexico: Challenges and Perspectives

Por Jonathan Maza

On October 8, 2024, President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo’s government presented its new Security Strategy, a plan aimed at confronting the growing violence and organized crime in Mexico. This strategy intends to continue the efforts of her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, but with a renewed focus that emphasizes the centralization of coordination and cooperation between security forces and the pursuit of solutions to the social and economic causes of crime.

Objectives and Pillars of the Strategy

The main objective of the new strategy is to reduce high-impact crimes such as homicides, kidnappings, and extortions linked to organized crime. Citizen security, especially in high-risk areas, will be a priority. The need to strengthen the National Guard is emphasized, while also promoting a more integrated approach to addressing the roots of crime.

The strategy is based on three key objectives and four pillars:

  1. Decrease High-Impact Crimes: Violence linked to organized crime, such as homicides and kidnappings, is the primary target. Special attention will also be paid to crimes like extortion and highway robbery.
  2. Neutralize Violence Generators: This involves focusing on criminal networks and the main actors responsible for violence in each of the 32 states. High-crime areas will be the focus of more intensive security operations.
  3. Strengthen Local Prevention: Prevention will be key in the fight against crime, with an emphasis on strengthening the capabilities of local police to improve proximity to the community.
  4. Address the Social and Economic Causes of Crime: Social programs like «Youth Building the Future» will continue, and efforts will be made to involve all sectors of government to create viable alternatives for young people at risk of joining criminal groups.
Consolidation of the National Guard and Armed Forces

One of the most significant measures in this strategy is the transfer of the National Guard (GN) to the control of the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), which will consolidate the military presence in public security. This move has generated controversy due to concerns from certain sectors about the militarization of security functions, which could lead to greater use of force and an increase in confrontations with criminal organizations.

However, the National Guard has also taken on criminal investigation functions as an auxiliary to the Federal Attorney General’s Office (FGR), and significant efforts are being made to professionalize and train its personnel to act more efficiently and professionally.

Strengthening Intelligence and Interinstitutional Coordination

The success of this strategy will largely depend on the government’s ability to coordinate its efforts at various levels. The creation of the National Intelligence System and the strengthening of the capabilities of the National Intelligence Center (CNI) are crucial steps to integrate information from various security agencies, such as the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA), the Navy (SEMAR), the SSPC, the FGR, and state prosecutors.

One of the key aspects of this approach is coordination between federal and state security forces, which will enable a more effective response to the challenges posed by organized crime, especially in regions like the northern border, which faces specific challenges due to violence and drug trafficking.

Challenges and Criticisms of the Strategy

Despite the good intentions, the new strategy faces several structural and operational challenges. First, the operational dependence on military capacities for public security raises concerns about the effectiveness of results in building a public security environment and the potential violation of human rights, a recurring issue during López Obrador’s administration. The growing role of the Armed Forces, both in controlling the National Guard and executing security operations, could lead to greater confrontation with criminal groups, increasing violence and collateral damage in areas already affected by crime.

Another concern is the inefficiency of social programs. Despite efforts to offer alternatives to vulnerable young people, the economic incentives from social programs have not significantly reduced crime rates. There is a risk that criminal organizations and their families may exploit these resources, perpetuating the cycle of violence rather than breaking it.

Furthermore, the restructuring of security and intelligence institutions could lead to coordination problems between various agencies, potentially affecting the flow of information and overall efficiency.

Impact on the Northern Border

One of the most affected states will be Baja California, which, in 2024, recorded one of the highest rates of intentional homicides in Mexico. Territorial disputes between cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel are the primary causes of this violence. While the region has received a historic investment of 280.4 million pesos for public security, the conditions along the Baja California-Sonora border remain complex, especially in areas like the Mexicali Valley, where violence persists.

The strategy should focus on strengthening coordination between federal and local authorities, especially in high-risk areas, to improve effectiveness in the fight against organized crime.

Conclusion

The new Security Strategy of the Government of Mexico has the potential to be a positive step toward reducing violence in the country, but it depends on its correct implementation and the government’s ability to overcome the many challenges it faces. The operational dependence on the Armed Forces, the inefficiency of social programs, and interinstitutional coordination are just some of the obstacles that could limit its success.

As President Sheinbaum has already proposed, an integrated approach is necessary that not only focuses on repressive action but also addresses the root causes of violence and crime, including poverty, lack of opportunities, and corruption at all levels of government. Only then will it be possible to create a safer Mexico with greater social justice.